The Board filed its Directors’ Circular on June 16, 2025, which provides information for shareholders about MEG’s prospects and the Board’s analysis, deliberations and recommendations. The Directors’ Circular is available below and on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca. Additional information can be found in the Investor Presentation, which is also available below.

In its Directors’ Circular, the Board details the reasons for its recommendations, including:

• The Offer’s share consideration exposes shareholders to a company with inferior assets. MEG’s asset portfolio is located in the heart of the Athabasca oil sands region, anchored by Christina Lake, a best-in-class SAGD project with top quartile asset characteristics and approximately five billion barrels of discovered bitumen initially-in-place (“DBIIP”) supporting decades of low-risk, attractive growth. Together with undeveloped resource at Surmont, May River and Kirby, MEG has approximately 11 billion barrels of DBIIP. By contrast, Strathcona’s assets are scattered, lack scale, and are located in less prolific areas with uncompetitive asset characteristics relative to MEG’s Christina Lake.
• Selling by WEF and its investors to provide liquidity will put downward pressure on the share price. WEF’s concentrated 51% ownership position introduces substantial and prolonged overhang risk, making the combined company a vehicle for WEF and its LP investors to sell their material ownership over time. Strathcona does not have sufficient trading liquidity for WEF and its LP investors to sell their interest in the market. If Strathcona combines with MEG, WEF will have more liquidity to attempt to sell its $6 billion stake. This selling pressure, or even the perceived risk of such selling pressure, will place immediate and significant downward burden on the share price of the combined company for a prolonged period of time.
• The Offer is inadequate. The Offer lacks a real premium. Its advertised premium was opportunistically calculated as the best and highest implied premium based on Strathcona’s relatively thin trading. Since the announcement of the Offer, MEG shares have consistently traded above the implied value of the Offer, indicating that the market believes it significantly undervalues MEG’s shares. In reality, the Offer of 0.62 of a Strathcona share and $4.10 in cash per MEG share does not represent a premium, but a significant discount when measured over periods other than the single day on which Strathcona calculated the advertised premium.
• Other paths to superior value maximization. MEG is a uniquely attractive investment opportunity: a pure play oil sands producer with best-in-class assets, an innovative team, and attractive growth opportunities. MEG warrants a premium valuation, which the Offer fails to deliver. MEG’s Board has authorized the Company to initiate a strategic review of alternatives with the potential to surface an offer superior to the Company’s compelling standalone plan.

As noted in the Directors’ Circular, the Board also considered the following:

• MEG’s standalone plan offers low-risk, visible brownfield growth and free cash flow generation;
• MEG has delivered outsized returns since its rejection of the previous unsolicited offer in 2018;
• Shareholders have publicly expressed concerns about the value of the Offer; and
• All research analysts covering MEG have price targets exceeding the value of the Offer.